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I. INTRODUCTION
In his song, “Ring Them Bells,”1 Bob Dylan sounds an alarm. “The
shepherd is asleep,” he tells us, “and the mountains are filled with lost
sheep.” Dylan recites a litany of disastrous consequences that can only
be averted if the faithful are awakened and renew their faith. The final
line of that song is particularly disturbing: “And they’re breaking down
the distance between right and wrong.”
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Clinical Professor,
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of California, San Diego.
1. BOB DYLAN, Ring Them Bells, on OH MERCY (Columbia Records Inc. 1989).
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This essay discusses one instance in which the distance between right
and wrong has broken down. It is the evaporating distinction between
sentence-serving convicts and mentally disordered nonconvicts who are
involved in, or who were involved in, the criminal process—people we
label as both bad and mad. By examining one Supreme Court case from
each of the decades that follow the opening of the University of San
Diego School of Law, the essay demonstrates how the promise that
nonconvict mentally disordered persons would be treated equally with
other civilly committed mental patients was made and then broken.
II. THE 1960S: BAXSTROM V. HEROLD2—THE PROMISE MADE
On May 17, 1954, only six weeks after the University of San Diego
School of Law commenced operations,3 the United States Supreme
Court decided the historic case of Brown v. Board of Education.4 To the
question: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities?,” the unanimous Court responded: “We
believe that it does.”5 Such segregation deprives minority group
children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 With simple elegance, Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the Court, declared: “Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.”7
The right of similarly situated persons to be treated equally before the
law is not limited to persons of different races. Nonconvict mental
patients, for example, are similarly situated with each other and cannot
be treated as convicts. In its 1966 decision in Baxstrom v. Herold,8 the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York statute that authorized,
through administrative decision, the civil commitment of mentally ill,
sentence-expiring convicts and their continued confinement in a
2. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
3. The University of San Diego School of Law commenced operations on April
5, 1954.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 493.
6. Id. at 495. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
7. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Although Rosa Park’s arrest in Montgomery,
Alabama on December 1, 1955 for refusing to stand to allow a white bus rider to take her
seat is generally regarded as the event that started the civil rights revolution, Brown’s
promise that the law will treat equally persons of different races presaged Ms. Parks’s
arrest by eighteen months.
8. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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maximum security mental institution operated by the Department of
Correction.9 Under the invalidated statute, sentence-expiring convicts
were the only persons subject to civil commitment who were denied a
jury review on the question of whether their mental condition met the
civil commitment criteria. They were also the only persons who were
denied court hearings on the question of whether they were dangerously
mentally ill, a prerequisite for confinement in a maximum security
mental institution.10
Writing for a unanimous Court,11 Chief Justice Warren rejected the
assertion that a person’s criminal tendencies or dangerous propensities
are established by his or her past criminal record.12 Equal protection
“demands”13 that sentence-expiring convicts receive the same procedural
safeguards that all others receive in the civil commitment process; they
cannot be specially classified to avoid the standard procedural
roadblocks to civil commitment.14 Equal protection also demands that
they receive the same procedural safeguards that all other civilly
committed patients receive before they may be placed in maximum
security confinement; they cannot be specially classified to avoid the
standard roadblocks to such placement.15 “[T]here is no conceivable
basis,” wrote the Chief Justice, “for distinguishing the commitment of a
person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil
commitments.”16
Although the Baxstrom Court considered only a sentence-expiring
convict’s right to procedural protections in the civil commitment
process and in decisions to place the patient in maximum security
confinement,17 just six years later, the Court construed its Baxstrom
9. Id. at 110–11.
10. Id. at 110–13.
11. Justice Black concurred in the result but wrote no opinion. Id. at 115.
12. Id. at 114.
13. “Demands” is the word choice of the Chief Justice. Id. at 115.
14. Id. at 110, 114–15.
15. Id. at 110.
16. Id. at 111–12.
17. See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). In Humphrey, the Supreme
Court applied its Baxstrom precedent to an individual convicted of the misdemeanor of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In lieu of a one-year maximum sentence, he
was committed pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crime Act to the sex deviate facility in the
state prison for a potentially indefinite period, i.e., initial commitment for a period equal
to the maximum sentence followed by renewable five-year commitment periods. Id. at
506–07. The Court ruled that petitioner’s contention that he was denied equal protection
in the renewal commitment, which did not accord him a jury trial accorded other persons
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precedent broadly, stating: “Baxstrom held that the State cannot
withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive
requirements for commitment that are available to all others.”18 If
convicts were to be civilly committed upon expiration of their criminal
sentences, the state was required to use the same civil commitment
statutes—the same procedures and same criteria—used to civilly commit
any other person, and to commit them to mental hospitals in which all
other civilly committed patients were placed, not in a facility
administered by the Department of Correction. Sentence-expiring
convicts could not be separately categorized for civil commitment
purposes.19 After all, when a prisoner’s sentence expires, his or her debt
to society has been paid, and the prisoner is no longer subject to further
punishment.
Although Baxstrom was decided almost forty years ago, it is not just a
viable precedent, it is a venerable precedent. Baxstrom has been cited in
more than 500 court decisions, including eighteen Supreme Court decisions.20
undergoing civil commitment, was substantial enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 508.
18. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 727 (1972) (emphasis added).
19. As a result of the Baxstrom decision, nearly one thousand sentence-expiring
prisoners were discharged from confinement under the unconstitutional law that
mandated their placement in maximum security mental hospitals administered by the
New York State Department of Correction. Almost all of the 992 Baxstrom patients
were civilly committed—using the criteria and procedures applicable to all others who
were civilly committed—and placed in mental hospitals administered by the New York
State Department of Mental Hygiene. Within a six-month period, 79 were discharged to
the community, 22 were conditionally released on convalescent care, 273 were
reclassified to voluntary patient status, and 24 were reclassified to informal patient
status. Only six had to be retransferred to maximum security hospitals operated by the
Department of Correction as dangerously mentally ill. Within the following six months,
an additional sixty-eight Baxstrom patients were discharged and only one was
retransferred to a maximum security hospital. Grant H. Morris, “Criminality” and the
Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784, 795 (1969). The results strongly suggest
that psychiatrists in the Department of Mental Hygiene: (1) overpredicted dangerous
mental illness, (2) were unwilling to accept and treat as mental patients those who were
identified as “dangerous” or labeled as “criminals”, and (3) had the ability to treat such
patients when they were integrated with and given treatment indistinguishable from that
provided to other civilly committed mental patients. Id. at 796; see also HENRY J.
STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 55–161 (1974)
(finding that the Baxstrom patients were not very dangerous and were successfully
treated in civil mental hospitals, id. at 108, and that when released to the community, few
displayed dangerous behavior, id. at 158); Grant H. Morris, The Confusion of
Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and
Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of New York, 17 BUFF. L.
REV. 651, 670–75 (1968) [hereinafter Morris, Confusion of Confinement].
20. See Westlaw Keycite for Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (examined
on July 29, 2004) (mentioning 512 court decisions in which Baxstrom is cited). The
Supreme Court most recently cited Baxstrom in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
369–70 (1997). Justice Thomas, who wrote the Court’s majority opinion in Hendricks,
cited Baxstrom, as did Justice Kennedy, who wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 369, 372
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III. THE 1970S: JACKSON V. INDIANA21—THE PROMISE EXTENDED
Prior to 1972, criminal defendants found mentally incompetent to
stand trial, i.e., unable to understand the criminal proceedings against
them or to assist in their defense,22 were confined until their competence
was restored.23 For many, “a finding of incompetence to stand trial was
tantamount to a life sentence.”24 However, in Jackson v. Indiana,25 the

(Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying notes 112–16.
21. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2001) (articulating as the standard for a finding
of incompetency to stand trial in federal cases “that the defendant is presently suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense”). The Supreme Court has ruled that the prohibition
against conducting a criminal trial of an incompetent defendant “is fundamental to an
adversary system of justice.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). The
suspension of criminal proceedings is warranted to assure the accuracy, fairness, and
dignity of the trial process and to justify the imposition of punishment if the defendant is
convicted. In many cases, the accused may be the only individual who has knowledge of
the facts underlying the criminal charge, and thus, an accurate assessment of guilt
requires the defendant’s assistance. To assure fairness in the criminal process, the
accused must have the basic capacity to assist counsel in presenting a defense. The
dignity of the criminal process would be undermined by the spectacle of an incompetent
defendant’s trial. The objective of punishment requires that a convicted defendant
comprehend the reasons why the court is imposing punishment. Note, Incompetency to
Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 457–59 (1967); Barbara A. Weiner, Mental
Disability and the Criminal Law, in AM. BAR FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 693, 694 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). The suspension of
criminal proceedings against incompetent defendants is “a by-product of the ban against
trial in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the
courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself.” Caleb Foote, A
Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832,
834 (1960).
23. A 1965 study of Matteawan State hospital, a maximum security institution
administered by the New York State Department of Correction, revealed that 208 of the
1062 mentally incompetent defendants at that facility had been detained there for twenty
years or more. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE
LAW RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 73 (1968). The patient
longest in residence at Matteawan at that time was an eighty-three-year-old patient who
had been accused of burglary in 1901 and who had been found mentally incompetent to
stand trial. Id. at 72. After sixty-four years of confinement at Matteawan, he was, at
least theoretically, still awaiting restoration to competence so that he could undergo a
criminal trial.
24. Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1, 4 (1993).
25. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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Supreme Court, again in a unanimous26 decision, invalidated a statute
permitting indeterminate, and potentially lifetime, commitment of a
mentally retarded, deaf-mute person who had been found incompetent to
stand trial.27 The Court ruled that its six-year-old Baxstrom principle
was not limited to sentence-expiring convicts but applies as well to
mentally incompetent criminal defendants: “If criminal conviction and
imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and
substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally
available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot
suffice.”28 Equal protection is denied when incompetent criminal
defendants are subjected to a more lenient commitment standard (i.e.,
incompetence to stand criminal trial) and to a more stringent release
standard (i.e., restoration of trial competence) than is applicable to all
other persons who are not charged with crimes and who could only be
detained under the state’s civil commitment laws.29
Although the finding of incompetence to stand trial may justify a brief
period of detention designed to restore the defendant’s competence, due
process requires that incompetent defendants who cannot soon be
restored to competency either must be released or be subjected to “the
customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to
commit indefinitely any other citizen.”30 Although the Court declined to
specify when civil commitment or release must occur, the Court noted
that detention of incompetent defendants is appropriate only for those
who “probably soon will be able to stand trial.”31 And even for those
defendants, the Court required that commitment “must be justified by
progress toward that goal.”32
Although Jackson was decided more than thirty years ago, it, too, is
not just a viable precedent, it is a venerable precedent. Jackson has been
cited in more than 600 court decisions, including twenty-six Supreme
Court decisions.33
26. Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the Court’s
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 741.
27. Id. at 717–19, 738.
28. Id. at 724.
29. Id. at 730.
30. Id. at 738.
31. Id. at 738. An incompetent defendant can only be held for a “reasonable
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he
will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Id. If such probability does not exist,
the defendant must be released or civilly committed. If such probability does exist, the
defendant may be detained for a limited time to attempt to restore his or her competency.
Id.
32. Id.
33. See Westlaw Keycite for Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (examined
on July 29, 2004) (mentioning 644 court decisions in which Jackson is cited). The
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IV. THE 1980S: JONES V. UNITED STATES34—THE PROMISE BROKEN
If sentence-expiring convicts and permanently incompetent criminal
defendants cannot be specially classified for civil commitment purposes,
it is logical to assume that any nonconvict cannot be specially classified
for that purpose—even if the individual has been involved in the criminal
process. In Jackson, the Supreme Court noted that the Baxstrom principle
had been extended to post-trial commitment decisions involving individuals
who had been absolved from criminal responsibility by insanity verdicts.35
A successful insanity defense precludes criminal responsibility. A seriously
mentally disordered person who engages in criminal behavior but who is
found not guilty of the crime because of that disorder is not blameworthy
and is not subject to criminal punishment.
Relying upon Baxstrom, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit,36 and the highest appellate courts in several states,37
held that an insanity verdict could not by itself justify the indeterminate
detention of an insanity acquittee. Although a finding of insanity at the
time of the criminal act warrants a post-trial evaluation of the acquittee’s
current mental condition, once that evaluation is completed, the
acquittee should not be distinguished from other nonconvict mentally
disordered persons in either the criteria applied to the commitment
decision or the procedures employed in the commitment process.38
Supreme Court most recently cited Jackson in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1989
(2004) (citing Jackson as an example of a Supreme Court decision identifying
unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in the specific context of
unjustified commitment).
34. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
35. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 724.
36. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Chief Judge David Bazelon,
writing for the court, relied on Baxstrom as establishing the principle that “the
commission of criminal acts does not give rise to a presumption of dangerousness which,
standing alone, justifies substantial difference in commitment procedures and
confinement conditions for the mentally ill.” Id. at 647. To confine an insanity acquittee
without affording him the standard civil commitment procedural protections denies him
equal protection. Id. at 651. The court rejected the argument, which the Supreme Court
also rejected in Baxstrom, that expeditious commitment of nonconvict mentally ill
persons is justified because of their dangerous or criminal propensities. Id. at 649.
37. See, e.g., State v. Clemons, 515 P.2d 324, 328–29 (Ariz. 1973); Wilson v.
State, 287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (Ind. 1972); People v. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d 569, 579–80,
586 (Mich. 1974); People v. Lally, 224 N.E.2d 87, 92 (N.Y. 1966); State v. Krol, 344
A.2d 289, 296–99 (N.J. 1975); State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 219 N.W.2d 341, 346–
47 (Wis. 1974).
38. See generally Grant H. Morris, Dealing Responsibly with the Criminally
Irresponsible, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 855 (asserting that although insanity acquittees can be
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Nevertheless, in its 1983 decision in Jones v. United States,39 a
narrowly divided Supreme Court held that “insanity acquittees constitute
a special class that [can] be treated differently from other candidates for
commitment.”40 As a special class, insanity acquittees can be subjected
to automatic, indeterminate commitment41 without first undergoing the
civil commitment process. For civil commitment generally, the state is
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is
both mentally ill and dangerous.42 According to the five-judge Jones
majority, the state has no such burden for insanity acquittee commitment.
In his criminal trial, Jones pleaded insanity as a defense to the crime
charged against him.43 The insanity verdict established beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed a criminal act and did so because of
mental illness.44 The legislature may determine that the insanity verdict
supports an inference of continuing mental illness45 and continuing
dangerousness.46 Thus, insanity acquittees can be distinguished from
others, such as incompetent criminal defendants, about whom such proof
is lacking.47
subjected to a post-trial evaluation to assess their current mental condition, they should
not be distinguished from other nonconvict mentally disordered persons in commitment,
release, and treatment decisions).
39. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
40. Id. at 370.
41. The District of Columbia statute interpreted in Jones provided, and continues
to provide, that within fifty days of commitment, a judicial hearing shall be held at which
the insanity acquittee can prove his or her eligibility for release. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24501(d)(2)(A) (2001). At that hearing, the burden is placed on the insanity acquittee to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has recovered his sanity and will not in
the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. Id. § 24-501(d)(2)(B), (e).
42. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979).
43. Jones, 463 U.S. at 359–60.
44. Id. at 363.
45. Id. at 366.
46. Id. at 364. The Jones majority reasoned that proof of the commission of a
criminal act is “concrete evidence” that “may be at least as persuasive as any predictions
about dangerousness that might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding.” Id.
47. The Court distinguished insanity acquittees from persons subjected to the
regular civil commitment process without any criminal charges brought against them and
from criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial. Incompetent criminal
defendants cannot be committed indefinitely because no affirmative proof has been
offered that they committed criminal acts or were dangerous. Id. at 364 n.12 (discussing
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
Some states have enacted statutes that provide for an evidentiary hearing on the
question of a permanently incompetent defendant’s guilt of the crime charged. See, e.g.,
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-1.5
(Michie 2000). If, at that hearing, the defendant is found to have committed a crime, he
or she is subjected to additional treatment without undergoing the civil commitment
process. Some might assert that, consistent with Jones, the determination of factual guilt
in the evidentiary hearing justifies the extended commitment of permanently
incompetent criminal defendants. Such statutes, however, do not conform to the
requirements of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Supreme
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In a dissenting opinion,48 Justice Brennan challenged the majority’s logic.
He noted that an insanity trial focuses on the defendant’s mental condition
in the past, at the time of the alleged criminal act. The post-trial
commitment decision focuses on the defendant’s mental condition now and
in the future. The finding of insanity at the time of the criminal act simply
does not provide an adequate basis from which to infer the present and
future mental condition of the insanity acquittee.49 Insanity acquittees are
similarly situated with sentence-expiring convicts who can “not be treated
differently from other candidates for civil commitment.”50 Just as the state
bears the burden of proving that sentence-expiring convicts and others
subjected to the civil commitment process are currently mentally ill and
dangerous, the state should also be obligated to prove the same for insanity
acquittees. Michael Jones, for example, had been charged with shoplifting.
If he had been found guilty of this nonviolent, petit larceny, the maximum
sentence that could have been imposed was one year.51 Instead of that one
year of punishment, he faced indeterminate—potentially lifetime—
confinement as an insanity acquittee. Justice Brennan asserted that the Jones
majority did not “purport to overrule Baxstrom or any of the cases which
have followed Baxstrom. It is clear, therefore, that the separate facts of
criminality and mental illness cannot support indefinite psychiatric
commitment, for both were present in Baxstrom.”52
Court declared that the purpose of committing an incompetent is to determine whether
the individual will be restored to competency in the near future, and if so, to treat the
individual toward that end. Id. at 738. No other purpose was identified by the Court in
Jackson, and no other purpose has been identified by the Court since it decided Jackson.
Because a factual finding of guilt is not related to progress in treatment to restore
competence, a factual guilt hearing cannot justify an extended period of treatment.
Even if the factual guilt finding could justify placement of incompetent defendants into
a special class for commitment purposes initially, the special commitment must end
when the justification for that commitment ends. If the incompetent defendant has not
progressed toward restoration of competence, he or she can no longer be committed as
an incompetent defendant. Subsequent commitment of the permanently incompetent
defendant, if it is to occur at all, must be achieved through the customary civil
commitment process used to commit any other citizen. Id. See Morris & Meloy, supra
note 24, at 18–23 (critiquing the use of evidentiary hearings to establish guilt of
permanently incompetent criminal defendants so that they may be detained without
customary civil commitment proceedings).
48. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan’s dissenting
opinion. Jones, 463 U.S. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented
separately. Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 375–76.
51. Id. at 359.
52. Id. at 380 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In Foucha v. Louisiana,
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Michael Perlin has asserted that the Jones majority’s abrupt departure
from the Court’s Baxstrom and Jackson precedents was an overtly
political decision designed to restore the public’s faith in the judicial
process.53 He may well be correct. After all, Jones was decided exactly
one year and eight days after the insanity acquittal verdict of John
Hinckley for his attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan.54
V. THE 1990S: KANSAS V. HENDRICKS55—THE PROMISE FORGOTTEN
In 1990, the state of Washington enacted the nation’s first Sexually
Violent Predator (SVP) legislation.56 Within five years, a handful of
states enacted similar, if not virtually identical, legislation.57 Unlike the
504 U.S. 71 (1992), the Court held that due process precludes the continued detention of
a dangerous, but not mentally ill, insanity acquittee. Id. at 83. Justice White, who wrote
the majority opinion, also addressed the equal protection issue in a portion of the opinion
in which three other justices joined. Justice White embraced and applied Justice
Brennan’s equal protection analysis in Jones. Because the state did not provide for
continuing confinement of sentence-expiring convicts who may be dangerous when their
sentences expire, it may not continue the confinement of insanity acquittees who may be
dangerous but who are no longer insane. Id. at 85. The state lacked a particularly
convincing reason for discriminating against insanity acquittees who are no longer
mentally ill. Id. at 86. They are similarly situated with sentence-expiring convicts. Id.
at 85. If sentence-expiring convicts cannot be separately categorized for civil
commitment purposes, insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill cannot be so
categorized.
53. See Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the
ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52
See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE
ALA. L. REV. 193, 211–12 (2000).
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 333–48 (1994) (discussing the impact of John
Hinckley’s attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan and his successful use of
an insanity defense on the subsequent development of the substantive insanity test and
procedural rules for use of the insanity defense).
54. John W. Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan on March
30, 1981. After a trial that lasted seven weeks, the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity on June 21, 1982. PETER W. LOW ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W.
HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1 (1986); see also LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984)
(discussing the Hinckley trial). The Jones case was decided by the Supreme Court on
June 29, 1983. Jones, 463 U.S. at 354.
55. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
56. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–
.902 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004)).
57. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (West 2003) (enacted
originally by 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 257); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3
(West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (enacted originally by 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 763, § 3); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (enacted originally by 1994
Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 2003) (enacted
originally by 1994 Minn. Laws, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 1, art. 1, § 3, which defined “sexually
dangerous person” in § 253B.02 (18c)); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.13 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2003) (enacted originally by 1993 Wis. Laws 479, § 40). After the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of SVP legislation in Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346 (1997), several more states enacted SVP legislation. See infra note 85.
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sexual psychopath legislation that it replaced,58 SVP statutes did not
merely substitute indeterminate confinement in a mental hospital for
determinate punishment in a prison; rather, it added indeterminate
confinement upon completion of the offender’s criminal sentence.
In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas’s
SVP Act59 against three claims of constitutional infirmity.60 Under the
Kansas statute, a sentence-expiring convict could be civilly committed
as an SVP if he had a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder”
that made him “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.”61
In Kansas v. Hendricks,62 the Court held that the Act satisfied substantive
due process requirements.63 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court’s fivejustice majority, noted that civil commitment statutes have been sustained
when they limit the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who,
because of mental illness, are dangerous and who are unable to control

58. Forty years ago, sexual psychopath legislation had been enacted in more than
half the states. Weiner, supra note 22, at 739. Through such legislation, criminal
defendants charged with or convicted of sex crimes and facing a determinate sentence
could be detained indefinitely for treatment until they were no longer dangerous. See id.
at 740–41. Sexual psychopath legislation was discredited, however, by the inability of
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to identify a specific mental disorder
experienced by individuals who should be included within the targeted group and by the
lack of successful treatment methodologies to improve their condition. Id. at 741–43.
The absence of treatment destroyed any valid basis for distinguishing sexual psychopath
prisoners from other prisoners in order to subject them to indeterminate commitment.
Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Sexual psychopath legislation was also challenged as violating procedural due process.
For example, in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), a unanimous Supreme Court
ruled that the possibility of indeterminate confinement based on a new finding of fact—
that the person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is a habitual offender
and mentally ill—entitled the person subjected to commitment under Colorado’s Sex
Offenders Act to the full panoply of due process protections, including the right to
counsel, to have an opportunity to be heard, to be confronted with witnesses, to crossexamine, to offer evidence of his own, and to have findings adequate to make a
meaningful appeal. Id. at 609–10.
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (enacted
originally by 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316).
60. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
61. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02(a), 59-29a07 (Supp. 2003). As originally
enacted, and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hendricks, the statute defining SVPs
referred to “predatory act of sexual violence.” Act of May 19, 1994, ch. 316, § 2, 1994
Kan. Sess. Laws 316. The statute has been amended and now refers to “repeat acts of
sexual violence.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2003).
62. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
63. Id. at 356–60. The U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any
person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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their dangerousness.64 Although the Kansas statute used the term “mental
abnormality” rather than “mental illness,” Justice Thomas dismissed the
importance of the distinction, declaring that “the term ‘mental illness’ is
devoid of any talismanic significance.”65 The legislature may define terms
of a medical nature for legal purposes and need not mirror the definitions
of the medical profession.66
The majority also found that the Act did not violate the Constitution’s
prohibition against double jeopardy67 or ex post facto lawmaking.68
The Court accepted as true the legislature’s stated intention to create
a new civil commitment scheme for SVPs, rather than to inflict
additional punishment for past criminal acts.69 Hendricks failed to
prove that the legislation was punitive either in purpose or effect.70
Incapacitation71—depriving the dangerously mentally ill of their
freedom—is a “legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective.”72 Thus,
even if SVPs suffer from an untreatable condition, they may be detained
so long as they pose a danger to others.73 If treatment is possible, the
fact that the state provides treatment only incidentally to its primary
64. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
65. Id. at 359. Justice Thomas used, without attribution, language employed by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin two years earlier. In a decision upholding the
constitutionality of Wisconsin’s SVP statutes, that court stated: “[T]here is no talismanic
significance that should be given to the term ‘mental illness.’” State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d
115, 122 (Wis. 1995).
66. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
67. Id. at 360–70. The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall “be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
68. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370–71. Article I of the Consitution, made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no “ex post facto Law
shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
69. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. But see Post, 541 N.W.2d at 135 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting). In dissenting from a pre-Hendricks Wisconsin Supreme Court decision
upholding the constitutionality of that state’s SVP statutes, Justice Shirley Abrahamson
asserted, “If reference to treatment were sufficient to render a statute civil, [Wisconsin’s
statutes that govern] prisons and jails, would be transmogrified into a civil statute.” Id.
at 137.
70. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. In finding that the SVP Act was not proven to
have a punitive purpose, the majority noted that, unlike a criminal statute, the Act did
“not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct,” and did not require scienter for
commitment. Id. at 362. The Act did not function as a deterrent because those
committed as SVPs are unable to exercise control over their behavior and are “unlikely
to be deterred by the threat of confinement.” Id. at 362–63. Additionally, SVPs
experience essentially the same conditions experienced by other civilly committed
persons, not the more restrictive conditions experienced by prisoners. Id. at 363. The
Act’s use of criminal process-type procedural safeguards to identify those who are civilly
committable did not convert the proceedings into criminal proceedings. Id. at 364.
71. Id. at 365.
72. Id. at 363.
73. Id. at 365–66.
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incapacitation objective, does not render the statutes punitive.74 Because
the Act was found to have a nonpunitive purpose, neither a double
jeopardy nor an ex post facto claim could be sustained.75 Hendricks was
not subjected to multiple punishments because SVP civil commitment is
neither punishment that follows a second prosecution for the same crime
for which he served a criminal sentence,76 nor punishment for conduct
that was legal before the statutes were enacted.77
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion. Three of the four dissenting
justices agreed with the majority that a state may enact separate civil
commitment statutes applicable to different categories of committable
individuals.78 Hendricks could be civilly committed as an SVP because he
suffered from a mental disorder—pedophilia—and lacked the ability to
control his dangerous actions.79 Without considering separately whether
substantive due process requires the state “to provide treatment that it
concedes is potentially available to a person whom it concedes is
treatable,”80 the four dissenters focused on the ex post facto claim that
posed the same issue.81 In their view, the statutes impermissibly imposed
punishment by delaying treatment until Hendricks completed his prison
sentence.82 Under the Act, diagnosis, evaluation, and commitment
proceedings—prerequisites for treatment—did not occur until the
convict’s criminal sentence was about to expire. Additionally, when
commitment proceedings were conducted, the decision maker was not
required to consider less restrictive alternatives to confinement.83 And
when Hendricks was civilly committed as an SVP, the record supported
74. Id. at 366–67.
75. Id. at 369.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 371. Although Justice Kennedy joined in the Court’s majority, he wrote
a short concurring opinion expressing his concern about the use of civil commitment
laws to confine those who have already been punished through the criminal process. Id.
at 371–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He cautioned that if civil confinement is used to
achieve retribution or general deterrence rather than mere incapacitation, it cannot be
validated. Id. at 373. If “mental abnormality” proves too uncertain a category to justify
civil commitment, its use cannot be condoned. Id.
78. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did not join in this portion
of Justice Breyer’s opinion and wrote no separate opinion expressing the reasons for her
decision. Id. at 373.
79. Id. at 374–77.
80. Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 381.
83. Id. at 387.
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the Kansas Supreme Court’s finding that the state did not provide
treatment.84
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
SVP legislation by the narrowest of margins, many states responded
quickly to the Hendricks decision by enacting SVP legislation.85 More
can be expected to join them.86 To avoid constitutional problems, the
legislation typically mimics the Kansas model.87 SVP statutes have
84. Id. at 390, 392 (noting that the Kansas Supreme Court found that Hendricks
was untreated, not that he was untreatable, and finding that “Kansas was not providing
treatment to Hendricks”). Under such circumstances, the dissenters agreed with the
Kansas Supreme Court’s finding that the treatment provisions of the statutes were
“somewhat disingenuous.” Id. at 393 (citing In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan.
1966)).
85. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910–.931 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 207/1–207/99 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 229A.1–.16 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.483–.513 (West
2000 & Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to -27.38 (West Supp. 2004); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to
70.19 (Michie Supp. 2003). The Illinois statutes were enacted one week after Hendricks
was decided. 1997 Ill. Laws 90-40 (approved June 30, 1997, effective Jan. 1, 1998).
North Dakota enacted its SVP statutes on April 8, 1997, two months prior to the
Hendricks decision, although the statutes became effective more than a month after
Hendricks was decided. 1997 N.D. Laws ch. 243, § 1 (approved and filed Apr. 8, 1997,
effective Aug. 1, 1997, and codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to .3-23 (2002)).
86. In Hendricks, thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and three territories
joined in an amicus brief supporting Kansas’s position that SVP legislation is an
appropriate and constitutional method to protect citizens from sexually dangerous
persons. Brief of the States of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae at 2, Hendricks (No.
95-1649), 1996 WL 471076. The brief addressed the substantive due process issue. The
state of Wisconsin wrote a separate amicus brief addressing ex post facto and double
jeopardy issues. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Wisconsin, Hendricks (No. 95-1649 &
95-9075), 1996 WL 469205. The multi-state brief expressed its approval of, and
expressly adopted, Wisconsin’s arguments. Brief of the States of Washington et al. as
Amici Curie at 2, Hendricks (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471076.
87. For example, many of the statutes begin with a declaration borrowed, nearly
verbatim, from the Washington and Kansas models:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually
violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them
appropriate for [the existing involuntary civil commitment law], which is intended
to be a short-term civil commitment system that is primarily designed to provide
short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders and then return
them to the community.
In contrast to persons appropriate for civil
commitment . . . , sexually violent predators generally have personality disorders
and/or mental abnormalities which are unamenable to existing mental illness
treatment modalities and those conditions render them likely to engage in sexually
violent behavior. The legislature further finds that [SVPs’] likelihood of engaging
in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary
commitment [laws are] inadequate to address the risk [of reoffense] . . . . The
legislature further finds that the prognosis for curing [SVPs] is poor, the treatment
needs of this population are very long term, and the treatment modalities for this
population are very different than the traditional treatment modalities for people
appropriate for commitment under [the existing involuntary civil commitment law].
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joined lengthened criminal sentences and sex offender registration laws88
as politically expedient controls on those who have committed violent
sexual offenses and who might do so again in the future.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court did not consider whether special
civil commitment legislation for SVPs violates the Equal Protection
Clause. In fact, the words “equal protection” do not appear even once in
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, in Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion, or in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.89 But given the
Court’s rejection of Hendricks’s substantive due process argument, it is
unlikely that the Court would have accepted an equal protection
argument that equated SVPs with other civilly committed mental
patients.90 The Hendricks majority found that the legislature may
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01
(Supp. 2003). States that begin their SVP Acts with a similar statement of legislative
findings include: 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 257, § 10 (the legislature’s findings are
found in the notes to ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (West 2003)); 1995 Cal. Stat. ch.
763, § 3 (the legislature’s findings are found in the historical and statutory notes to CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West 2002);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.1 (West Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25 (West
Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-20 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2004).
88. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
89. Leroy Hendricks did raise an equal protection claim in his cross-petition to the
Supreme Court. Conditional Cross Petition at 16–18, Hendricks (No. 95-1649),
microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Microform, Inc.). However, in
his brief as cross-petitioner, Hendricks did not argue the equal protection claim. In a
footnote, the cross-petitioner stated: “Mr. Hendricks’ cross-petition also sought review of
his equal protection challenge to the statute. This claim will be subsumed in his
substantive due process argument, and will not be separately briefed.” Brief for Leroy
Hendricks Cross-Petitioner at *2 n.1, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), 1996 WL
450661. In its brief as cross-respondent, Kansas asserted that Hendricks abandoned his
equal protection claim by failing to argue its merits in his cross-petitioner’s brief and
requested that the Court so rule. Brief of Cross-Respondent, at *4, *39–40, Hendricks
(No. 95-9075), 1996 WL 509502. The state characterized this failure as an apparent
attempt to evade the page limit requirements established by Supreme Court rule “or to
manipulate the briefing process” by forcing the state either to address first the equal
protection claim that Hendricks alone had raised or to wait until the state’s final reply
brief to respond. Id. at *40. In his reply brief for cross-petitioner, Hendricks did not
address the state’s argument. See Reply Brief for Cross-Petitioner, Hendricks (Nos. 951649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 593579.
The Supreme Court did not discuss the question of whether Hendricks’s equal
protection claim could be appropriately subsumed within his substantive due process
argument or comment on the state’s request for a ruling that Hendricks had abandoned
his equal protection claim. The Court merely noted that Hendricks’s cross-petition
asserted double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
90. See Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish
Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1213–17 (asserting that an equal protection
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identify for civil commitment purposes “a limited subclass of dangerous
persons.”91 The Kansas SVP Act met that requirement by restricting
SVP commitment to individuals who have a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that they are unable to control and that renders them
likely to engage in predatory92 acts of sexual violence.93 SVPs are more
dangerous as a group than are other civilly committed mental patients.
An equal protection argument that SVPs are no more dangerous than,
and therefore are similarly situated with, other civilly committed patients
is likely to fail.94
Nevertheless, because SVP legislation is applicable, not to all persons
who can be categorized as SVPs, but only to some, such legislation may
be vulnerable to an equal protection attack.95 Typically, SVP legislation
does not authorize civil commitment of all those who suffer from a
mental disorder, no matter how narrowly or broadly defined, and who
are likely to engage in repeated acts of sexual violence. Rather, SVP
commitment is limited only to persons who fit within one of three
groups and who are about to be released from confinement: sentenceexpiring convicts, persons found mentally incompetent to stand trial, and
insanity acquittees.96
Individuals who do not fit into one of these three categories are not
subject to SVP commitment even if they are equally likely to engage in
sexually violent conduct and are unable to control their dangerousness
due to mental abnormality or personality disorder. Thus, for example,
ex-convicts who were punished for sexually violent crimes and who
could be predicted to commit additional sexually violent crimes are not
subject to SVP commitment if they already served their criminal
sentences and were released from confinement before the SVP Act was
enacted. Criminal defendants who are charged with, but not yet
convicted of, sexually violent crimes and who could be predicted to
argument that SVPs are similarly situated with other civilly committed patients is not
likely to succeed).
91. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
92. After the decision in Hendricks, the Kansas legislature amended the statute to
require a likelihood of “repeat” acts of sexual violence instead of “predatory” acts of
sexual violence. See supra note 61.
93. Id. at 358.
94. Even three of the four dissenting justices agreed that Kansas was not
constitutionally prohibited from adopting two separate civil commitment statutes “each
covering somewhat different classes of committable individuals.” Id. at 377 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
95. See Morris, supra note 90, at 1217–27 (asserting that an equal protection claim
may be successful if it demonstrates that sentence-expiring convicts and others who may
be identified as SVPs and subjected to SVP commitment are similarly situated with other
persons identifiable as SVPs but not subject to SVP commitment).
96. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03(a), -29a07(a) (Supp. 2003).
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commit additional sexually violent crimes are not subject to SVP
commitment. Criminal defendants who are charged with violent crimes,
but not sexually violent crimes, are not subject to SVP commitment.
Individuals who have not yet been charged with sexually violent crimes,
and indeed, individuals who have not yet committed such crimes, are not
subject to SVP commitment. And yet, in each case, their mental
abnormalities or personality disorders and their difficulty in controlling
their sexual urges may make them just as dangerous as those who are
about to be released from confinement and who have been legislatively
targeted for special SVP commitment.97 Although the Supreme Court
permits the legislature “to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine
its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be
clearest,”98 the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the legislature from
discriminating between individuals when the danger that they pose is
equal. The state has no compelling interest to so discriminate.
Baxstrom v. Herold 99 and Jackson v. Indiana100 tell us that sentenceexpiring convicts and permanently incompetent criminal defendants
cannot be specially classified for civil commitment purposes. SVP
legislation, however, separately categorizes these individuals for SVP
commitment. Baxstrom and Jackson tell us that the same civil
commitment standards and procedures must be applied to sentenceexpiring convicts and permanently incompetent defendants that are
applied to any other nonconvicts. SVP legislation, however, applies
different commitment standards and procedures to these individuals for
97. Consider, for example, the case of In re Diestelhorst, 716 N.E.2d 823 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999). A pedophile, who was released after serving a ten-year prison term for
sexually molesting children, attempted to lure a young girl into his car. He was
apprehended and pled guilty to the crime of child abduction. Id. at 824. As his sentence
was expiring, the state petitioned for SVP commitment. Id. at 825. Despite expert
testimony that he had a “lingering sexual penchant for children,” the appellate court
dismissed the petition. Id. Child abduction is not a sexually violent offense, and under
Illinois law, only those who are completing confinement for a sexually violent offense
are subject to SVP commitment. Id. at 827. The court rejected the state’s argument that
SVP commitment is appropriate because the crime, although not specifically defined as
violent, was sexually motivated. Id. at 827–29. The perpetrator, according to the state,
sought to gratify “an aberrant sexual preference. He wanted to sexually molest his prey.”
Id. at 826. If, as the court assumed, the state correctly assessed the criminal’s
motivation, would anyone believe that this individual is less sexually dangerous than
another pedophile who was not apprehended until after he sexually molested a child and
who was therefore subject to SVP commitment?
98. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940).
99. 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see supra text accompanying notes 8–19.
100. 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 25–32.
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SVP commitment. If sentence-expiring convicts and permanently
incompetent defendants can only be involuntarily confined as are other
civilly committed patients, then they are civilly committed patients, and
cannot be morphed into SVPs or another special hybrid class of patient
with “criminal” as well as “civil” features.
Although Jones v. United States101 tells us that insanity acquittees can
be specially classified for post-criminal trial confinement without
undergoing the civil commitment process,102 their special classification
for SVP commitment purposes can not be justified. Insanity acquittees
are not subject to SVP commitment immediately after their criminal
trials, but rather, only after they are about to be released from
confinement as insanity acquittees.103 Such release does not occur until
the acquittee is no longer dangerous, i.e., is not likely to cause harm
either to the acquittee or to others.104 Thus, an insanity acquittee who
currently suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes him likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence—the
definitional criteria for SVP adjudication105—is unlikely to be released
from insanity acquittee commitment as not dangerous. In reality,
insanity acquittees who are not too dangerous to be released from
insanity acquittee confinement but who are dangerous enough to be
confined as SVPs do not exist. Insanity acquittees, therefore, are not a
special category for SVP commitment purposes; they are a noncategory.
Although the Hendricks Court did not consider or resolve an equal
protection challenge, it was well aware of the Baxstrom decision.
Baxstrom was discussed and specifically cited in briefs submitted by the
State of Kansas106 and in amicus briefs supporting Kansas’s position.107
101. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 39–47.
103. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03(a)(3), -29a04(a) (Supp. 2003).
104. Id. §§ 22-3428(3) (authorizing transfer to a less restrictive hospital environment,
conditional release, or discharge) & 22-3428(7)(a), (b)(B) (defining “mentally ill person” as
one who “is likely to cause harm to self or others” and defining “likely to cause harm to
self or others” as “likely, in the reasonably foreseeable future, to cause substantial
physical injury or physical abuse to self or others or substantial damage to another’s
property”). In many states, insanity acquittees may not be released until a court finds
that they are no longer dangerous to others. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(c)
(West Supp. 2004).
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2003).
106. Brief of Cross-Respondent at 46–47, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997) (No. 95-9075), 1996 WL 509502 (asserting that adequate procedural rights are
provided in the SVP civil commitment process).
107. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Wisconsin at 8 n.4, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649,
95-9075), 1996 WL 469205 (asserting that adequate procedural rights are provided in the
SVP civil commitment process); Brief of the Menninger Foundation et al. as Amici
Curiae at 21, Hendricks (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 470942 (asserting that Baxstrom
permits civil commitment of sentence-expiring convicts).
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Baxstrom was discussed and specifically cited by Carla Stovall, Attorney
General of the State of Kansas, in her oral argument to the Court.108
And when Thomas Weilert began his oral argument on behalf of Leroy
Hendricks, he completed only five sentences before he was interrupted
by a question asking about the applicability of Baxstrom to the case then
before the Court.109 A justice asked: “Well, didn’t the Court in Baxstrom
uphold essentially the notion that the State could commit people after they
were released from prison in a civil commitment proceeding?”110 Mr.
Weilert answered: “I believe the Court upheld that they could commit
after a—pardon me. After a criminal sentence if they were mentally ill,
yes, Your Honor.”111 The answer was unfortunate and unilluminating.
Baxstrom was discussed and specifically cited by Justice Thomas in
his majority opinion in Hendricks112 and by Justice Kennedy in his
concurring opinion.113 But in each instance, Baxstrom was misused; its
precedent distorted. Justice Thomas, for example, asserted that in
Baxstrom, “we expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow
the expiration of a prison term.”114 Justice Thomas neglected to
mention, however, that Baxstrom prohibits the commitment process for
sentence-expiring convicts to be distinguished from the process used for
all others undergoing civil commitment. In Baxstrom, the Court
specifically held that “no conceivable basis [exists] for distinguishing
the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from
all other civil commitments.”115
Would Justice Thomas also apply his revisionist analysis to Brown v.
Board of Education to assert that public schools may be racially
segregated so long as they provide equal education, ignoring the
Supreme Court’s finding that “[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal”?116 If Topeka, Kansas was not permitted to
108. Oral Argument of Carla J. Stovall on Behalf of Kansas, at *7, Hendricks (Nos.
95-1649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 721073 (asserting that Baxstrom permits civil commitment
of sentence-expiring convicts).
109. Oral Argument of Thomas J. Weilert on Behalf of Hendricks, at *33, Hendricks
(Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 721073.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
113. Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 369. Justice Kennedy made the same point. Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
115. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111–12 (1966).
116. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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discriminate against similarly situated persons in 1954, the state of
Kansas should not have been permitted to do so in 1997.
Separate categorization of sentence-expiring convicts for civil
commitment purposes could not withstand even the lowest level, rational
basis equal protection scrutiny in 1966. It should not be able to
withstand a heightened level of scrutiny today.117 In Foucha v.
Louisiana,118 decided five years before Hendricks, the Supreme Court
identified freedom from physical restraint as the core liberty interest
protected by the Constitution from arbitrary governmental action.119 It is
difficult to understand how the core liberty interest protected by the
Constitution could be characterized as anything less than fundamental.120
117. Strict scrutiny equal protection analysis was first articulated in 1942. Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Intermediate or mid-level
scrutiny, which some authors have suggested is appropriate for SVP commitment
legislation, was first recognized in 1976, ten years after Baxstrom was decided. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210–11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he relatively
deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus
when [the Court addresses] a gender-based classification.”).
118. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
119. Id. at 80. The Supreme Court has ruled that even sentence-serving convicts
have a liberty interest that protects them against unwarranted administrative transfer
from a prison, where they are punished, to a mental hospital, where they are treated
involuntarily for their psychiatric condition. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493–94
(1980).
120. In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Supreme
Court noted that whenever “legislation . . . involves one of the basic civil rights of
man . . . strict scrutiny of the classification . . . is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise,
invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of
the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.” Id. at 541.
Despite such pronouncements, one critic of Supreme Court equal protection analysis
described it as a “crazy-quilt approach” that “lack[s] coherence and consistency.” John
Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1191, 1192, 1197 (1999). He noted that “the Court seems to observe some of its rules of
equal protection analysis more in the breach than otherwise.” Id. at 1193. The Court’s
equal protection decision making has been strongly criticized, not just by numerous
scholars, id. at 1194 n.12 (citing authorities), but also by the justices themselves. Id. at
1194 n.13 (quoting statements of Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall, and
Chief Justice Burger).
Some authors believe that Supreme Court decisions support application of an
intermediate level of review to laws permitting involuntary civil commitment of insanity
acquittees, criminal defendants found permanently mentally incompetent to stand trial,
and SVPs. See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally Disordered “Super
Criminals”: A Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651, 669–81
(1996) [hereinafter Cornwell, “Super Criminals”]; John Kip Cornwell, Protection and
Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1293, 1316–19 (1996) [hereinafter Cornwell, Protection and Treatment]. Cornwell
proposes use of a “particularly exacting standard” for such cases. Cornwell, “Super
Criminals,” supra, at 679; Cornwell, Protection and Treatment, supra, at 1317–18; see
also Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington’s New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105, 136 (1990) (asserting that courts should apply mid-level
scrutiny to SVP equal protection claims because SVPs are a quasi-suspect group). But
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In Foucha, the Supreme Court held: “Freedom from physical restraint
being a fundamental right, the State must have a particularly convincing
reason . . . for such discrimination . . . .”121 And yet, in Hendricks,
Justice Thomas did not consider whether Kansas’s SVP commitment
statutes deprived Hendricks of a fundamental right,122 and if so, whether
such deprivation satisfies the test of strict scrutiny. Justice Thomas
simply accepted, at face value, the state’s categorization of SVP
commitment as “civil” and imposed upon Hendricks the heavy, if not
impossible, burden of establishing by the clearest proof that the
legislative scheme was punitive.123
VI. THE 2000S: SELL V. UNITED STATES124—WHAT PROMISE?
Sell v. United States, decided in 2003, is the most recent Supreme
Court case considering mental disorder and the civil/criminal distinction.
Unlike the cases previously discussed in this article, the Sell case did not
involve the classification of individuals for involuntary commitment, but
rather, involved the right of certain involuntarily committed individuals
to refuse treatment. Specifically, the Court in Sell considered whether
see In re Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ill. 2000) (applying a rational basis test to an
SVP equal protection claim).
121. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86 (White, J., plurality opinion). Justice White wrote the
majority opinion for Parts I and II of Foucha, and a plurality opinion for Part III. The
quotation is from Part III. This language departs from the “strict scrutiny”/“rational
basis” dichotomy traditionally employed to review substantive due process and equal
protection claims.
122. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that confinement for compulsory
psychiatric treatment is “a massive curtailment of liberty.” Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 509 (1972). Those who are involuntarily hospitalized as mentally ill are subjected
to psychiatric treatment that probes their innermost thoughts and to antipsychotic
medication that dulls and alters those thoughts. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324–25
(1993). Forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial may violate a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
133–38 (1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that under the due process
clause, even sentence-serving convicts possess “a significant liberty interest in avoiding
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 221–22 (1990). “The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s
body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” Id. at 229.
Involuntarily confined patients may also be subjected to mandatory behavior
modification programs. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492. People who are involuntarily
hospitalized because they are dangerous are stigmatized by that finding. See Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979). Such stigma “can have a very significant impact
on the individual.” Id. at 426.
123. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
124. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

1197

MORRIS.DOC

8/22/2019 11:25 AM

the government may administer antipsychotic medication to an
incompetent criminal defendant against his or her will in order to render
the defendant competent to stand trial for a nonviolent crime or whether
forced administration of antipsychotic medication unconstitutionally
deprives the defendant of his or her liberty interest to reject medical
treatment.125
The Court upheld the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication provided the treatment was medically appropriate,
substantially unlikely to have side effects that could undermine the
fairness of the trial, and necessary to significantly further important
governmental, trial-related interests.126 Justice Breyer, writing for the
Court’s six-justice majority,127 discussed these requirements in detail128
and opined that instances of permissible forced medication solely to restore
trial competence “may be rare.”129 Nevertheless, the Sell majority held
that the requirements that limit forced medication to restore trial
competence need not be considered if forced medication is warranted for
a different purpose—such as when the defendant is dangerous either to
others or to himself or herself.130 At two separate places in his
opinion,131 Justice Breyer emphasized that these alternative grounds
should be considered before the issue of forced medication to restore
trial competence is considered.132
125. See id. at 169, 177.
126. Id. at 179.
127. Id. at 168. Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice O’Connor
and Justice Thomas, asserted that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because the
District Court’s order was neither a final decision nor an interlocutory order specified by
statute that would permit an appeal and a decision on the merits. Id. at 186–87 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The dissenters expressed concern that by allowing the appeal, the
majority would enable criminal defendants “to engage in opportunistic behavior” by
voluntarily taking medication until partway through trial and then abruptly refusing it
while demanding an interlocutory appeal from an order that the medication be continued
on an involuntary basis. Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 180–81.
129. Id. at 180. Despite Justice Breyer’s statement, post-Sell orders of forcible
medication solely to restore trial competence may not be rare. Within months of the Sell
decision, at least two federal district courts, applying the factors articulated in Sell,
ordered an incompetent defendant involuntarily medicated solely to restore trial
competence. See United States v. Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 169 (D. Conn. 2004);
United States v. Evans, 2004 WL 533473, *2 (W.D. Va. 2004). See infra note 132.
130. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181–82.
131. Id. at 181–83.
132. Id. Two federal district court decisions, rendered within months of the Sell
decision, suggest that judges are not performing in good faith the Supreme Court’s
required exploration of alternative grounds for forced medication of incompetent
criminal defendants. For example, in United States v. Evans, 2004 WL 533473 (W.D.
Va. 2004), the court merely considered the Sell factors for ordering the involuntary
medication of incompetent criminal defendants solely to restore trial competence and did
not consider alternative grounds for involuntary medication of the defendant. In fact, the
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The Sell majority asserted that two prior Supreme Court
precedents—Riggins v. Nevada133 and Washington v. Harper134—“set
forth the framework” for the Sell decision.135 Justice Breyer, however,
misstated and misapplied those cases, perverting their precedential
value. In Riggins, the Court reversed the conviction of a mentally
competent defendant who was involuntarily medicated during his
criminal trial. The record failed to establish that the administration of
antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state
policy that would permit the state to override the defendant’s liberty
interest in freedom from unwanted medication136 and his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial.137
Because Riggins did not involve an incompetent defendant, the case
did not establish the substantive standards that govern the forced
medication of incompetent defendants. In fact, the Riggins majority
specifically acknowledged that “we have not had occasion to develop
substantive standards for judging forced administration of
[antipsychotic] drugs in the trial or pretrial settings.”138 The Riggins
majority did, however, suggest a standard that, in its words, “certainly
would . . . satisf[y] due process.”139 Due process would be satisfied if
the trial court finds that the compelled treatment is “medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the
sake of [the defendant’s] own safety or the safety of others.”140
Additionally, the Riggins majority opined that due process “might” be
court specifically stated that it would not determine at this time whether the defendant
was sufficiently dangerous to permit his long-term civil commitment. Id. at *2, n.3. In
United States v. Gomes, 305 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Conn. 2004), the court discussed at
length the applicability of the Sell factors to the facts before it and concluded that the
requirements for involuntary medication of the incompetent defendant were met. Id. at
163–68. As an apparent afterthought, the court devoted only one paragraph to a
discussion of whether alternative grounds for involuntary treatment existed and found
that the defendant was not dangerous to others in the prison population, that his refusal to
take medication would not put his health gravely at risk, and that appointing a
conservator to make medical decisions on his behalf was not appropriate. Id. at 169.
133. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
134. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
135. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177–78.
136. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137–38.
137. See id. at 138.
138. Id. at 135. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas asserted that the Riggins’
majority “appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.” Id. at 156 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The majority denied the assertion. Id. at 136.
139. Id. at 135.
140. Id.
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satisfied if the compelled treatment is medically appropriate and an
adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be obtained using less intrusive
means.141 These gratuitous comments involved speculation on a question
that was not before the Court for decision, and thus, were purely dicta.
Nevertheless, with little more consideration of the issue, the Sell
majority adopted these comments as its holding for incompetent
defendants.
The Sell majority’s reliance on Washington v. Harper142 is even more
dubious. Harper involved a sentence-serving convict, not an
incompetent defendant awaiting trial. The Harper Court held: “[G]iven
the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause
permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s
medical interest.”143 Further, the Harper Court ruled that the prisoner
was not entitled to a judicial hearing to determine whether he was
competent to refuse medication144 and upheld administrative hearing
procedures in which a hearing committee, composed of a psychiatrist,
psychologist, and the associate superintendent of the facility,145 reviews
the medical treatment decision.146
The Harper Court, relying upon the state’s legitimate interest in
reducing danger posed by prisoners in the prison environment,147
141. Id.
142. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
143. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 222, 226, 228.
145. Id. at 215. Harper was confined in the Special Offender Center, a Department
of Corrections correctional institute established “to diagnose and treat convicted felons
with serious mental disorders.” Id. at 214.
146. Id. at 232–33. The committee reviews the medical decision that the prisoner
has a mental disorder that is likely to cause harm if not treated and that treatment is in the
prisoner’s medical interests given the legitimate need of the prisoner’s institutional
confinement. See id. at 222.
147. Id. at 225. Less than a year after its Harper decision, however, the Court
hinted that its Harper precedent might be applicable to a treatment refusal situation that
did not involve prison security. In Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam),
the Court vacated a Louisiana trial court decision that had ordered a death row inmate to
be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic medication to restore him to competency to be
executed. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. 1992). The Supreme Court
ordered reconsideration in light of Harper. Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. at 38. Although
Perry was a prisoner, there was no proof that without medication he was dangerous to
himself or others. Was the Court suggesting that mentally disordered prisoners cannot
be treated involuntarily if they are not dangerous? Was the Court suggesting that
dangerousness is not the only justification for treatment of mentally disordered
prisoners? Was the Court suggesting that proof of dangerousness may justify
involuntary treatment of mentally disordered nonprisoners? On remand, the trial court
reinstated its order, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. State v. Perry, 610 So.
2d at 747, 771. The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished Harper, holding that the
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specifically distinguished sentence-serving prisoner mental patients from
all other involuntarily confined mental patients. “There are few cases,”
wrote Justice Kennedy for the majority, “in which the State’s interest in
combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is
greater than in a prison environment.”148 Because prisoners have “a
demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct,”149 the state’s interest in combating danger posed by
prisoners—both to themselves and to others—is greater in the prison
environment than elsewhere.150
Two years after Harper, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court’s
majority in Riggins, explained that “the unique circumstances of penal
confinement”151 were crucial to the Harper Court’s decision to allow the
state to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to dangerous,
mentally disordered, sentence-serving prisoners. Charles Sell, however,
was not a sentence-serving prisoner. This dentist was an incompetent
criminal defendant charged with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money
laundering.152 Because he had not yet been convicted of those crimes,
he could not be subjected to the unique circumstances of penal
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication for the purpose of restoring
competence for execution “does not constitute medical treatment but forms part of the
capital punishment sought to be executed by the state.” Id. at 753. The court held that
forced medication of a death row prisoner violates “state constitutional rights of privacy
or personhood and humane treatment.” Id. at 755.
148. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
149. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
150. Id. A prison regulation that is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests will be upheld as valid even if it infringes on prisoners’ constitutional rights.
Id. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The validity of a prison
regulation will be measured by the “reasonable relationship” standard even when the
infringed constitutional right is fundamental and a more rigorous standard of review
would have been required in nonprison settings. Id. (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
Harper asserted that the state’s failure to provide him with a judicial hearing on his
competence to refuse medication before administering antipsychotic medication over his
objection violated the due process, equal protection, and free speech clauses of both the
federal and state constitutions, as well as state tort law which requires informed consent
to treatment. Id. at 217. The Supreme court’s Harper opinion addressed only the due
process issue. Nevertheless, if due process can be satisfied by a prison regulation that is
reasonably related to the state’s legitimate penological interest in prison safety and
security even when it infringes on a prisoner’s fundamental constitutional rights, it is
unlikely that equal protection and free speech claims, even if independently and fully
considered by the Court, would have succeeded.
151. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992).
152. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 170 (2003).
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confinement. He may be innocent of those crimes, and, in fact, the law
presumes his innocence.153 For the Sell majority to rule that Harper’s
holding and rationale for forced medication of sentence-serving
prisoners is equally applicable to Charles Sell and to other criminal
defendants is ludicrous.
If Riggins, which involved a competent criminal defendant, and
Harper, which involved a sentence-serving convict, provide an
inadequate framework for analyzing the right of incompetent criminal
defendants to refuse antipsychotic medication, are there other Supreme
Court precedents that provide a better analytic framework? The answer
is: “yes,” and the cases are Baxstrom and Jackson. Although neither
case involved a patient’s right to refuse treatment, both involved the
question of the patient’s status, a question that must be resolved before
the patient’s rights as a patient can be considered. In Baxstrom, the Court
held that when a prisoner’s sentence expires, he or she is no longer a
sentence-serving convict. If the sentence-expiring prisoner’s mental
disorder necessitates involuntary hospitalization, he or she can not be
distinguished from any other person undergoing the civil commitment
process.154 If the sentence-expiring prisoner is committed, he or she is a
civil patient. In Jackson, the Court applied its Baxstrom precedent to
permanently incompetent criminal defendants. They, too, cannot be
separately categorized for commitment purposes. The civil commitment
process used to involuntarily detain any other citizen must be used to
involuntarily detain a permanently incompetent criminal defendant.155 If
the incompetent defendant is committed, he or she is a civil patient.
These two decisions maintain the civil/criminal distinction; the Sell
decision does not.
If permanently incompetent criminal defendants are civil patients, then
criminal defendants whose competence is not permanent are also civil
patients. Both are accused, but not convicted, of crime. Though their
153. Because the incompetent defendant has not been tried for the crime charged
against him or her, the defendant retains the status of any accused, but not convicted,
criminal defendant. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until they are convicted.
As Justice Stevens noted: “Prior to conviction every individual is entitled to the benefit
of a presumption . . . that he is innocent of prior criminal conduct . . . .” Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 582 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
503 (1976) (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution,
is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”); Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).
154. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110–12 (1966); see supra text accompanying
notes 8–16.
155. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724, 730, 738 (1972); see supra text
accompanying notes 25–32.
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potential for restoration to trial competence may differ, their nonconvict,
nonprisoner status is identical.
The Sell Court did not consider the implications of the Baxstrom and
Jackson precedents on the patient status of incompetent criminal
defendants. Neither Baxstrom nor Jackson were discussed or even cited.
In 1999, Charles Sell was institutionalized in the United States Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, as incompetent to
stand trial.156 He remained in that institution and in that patient status in
2003, when the Supreme Court decided the Sell case. Although Jackson
forbids the lengthy confinement of an incompetent defendant as an
incompetent defendant,157 the Sell Court did not question the propriety of
Charles Sell’s four-year confinement as an incompetent defendant and
his continued confinement in that patient status.158 The Sell majority
simply acknowledged that Sell had already been confined “for a long
period of time, and that his refusal to take antipsychotic drugs might
result in further lengthy confinement”159—factors that would diminish
the importance of the government’s interest in prosecuting Sell.160 One
156. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170–71.
157. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738; see supra text accompanying note 31.
158. A review of legislation in the fifty states and the District of Columbia,
conducted twenty years after Jackson was decided, revealed that the Supreme Court’s
decision has been ignored or circumvented in a majority of jurisdictions. See Morris and
Meloy, supra note 24, at 13–33. Some states ignore Jackson by continuing to allow
incompetent defendants to be detained until their competence has been restored. Id. at
13. Others evade Jackson by imposing a lengthy period of treatment before
acknowledging that the defendant is permanently incompetent, i.e., that there is no
substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to stand trial in the
foreseeable future. Id. at 15–18. Several states tie the maximum length of the treatment
period to the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the defendant was
convicted of the crime charged. Id. at 17–18. In California, permanently incompetent
criminal defendants can be placed on mental health conservatorships using different
criteria than are used to establish mental health conservatorships for all other mentally
disordered people. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5350, 5008(h)(1)(A)–(B) (West 1998).
By law, other conservatees must be placed in the least restrictive placement. Id. §
5358(a)(1)(A). In contrast, by law, permanently incompetent criminal defendant
conservatees must be placed in a facility “that achieves the purposes of treatment of the
conservatee and protection of the public.” Id. § 5358(a)(1)(B).
The failure to individualize placement may violate a patient’s right to placement in the
least restrictive appropriate treatment setting. See Perlin, supra note 53, at 231–34
(asserting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999),
interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, may require individualized placement
decision making for permanently incompetent criminal defendants and other forensic
patients, rather than uniform placement in maximum security institutions).
159. Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.
160. See id. at 180, 186 (requiring that important governmental interests be at stake,
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might well ask whether Jackson has been overruled sub silencio.161
If incompetent criminal defendants are civil patients, then they are
entitled to the same right to medical self-determination that other civil
patients possess. In many states, courts have held that civilly committed
patients have a right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication
unless they lack the capacity to make treatment decisions—i.e., to weigh
the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed medication.162 Civilly
committed patients—including incompetent criminal defendants—are not
similarly situated with mentally disordered, sentence-serving prisoners
whose right to refuse treatment is governed by their danger to
themselves and others, not their capacity to understand the consequences
of the proposed therapy.163
In fact, because civilly committed patients have been confined without
a criminal trial and without a criminal conviction, special deference
should be paid to their decisions to refuse treatment. The state has
exercised its authority to detain them because of their predicted
dangerousness or inability to provide for themselves. The state’s
and suggesting that lengthy pretrial detention diminishes the importance of the
government’s interest in prosecuting the defendant).
161. In mentioning the possibility that Sell might be subjected to “further lengthy
confinement,” perhaps the majority only meant to suggest that if Sell was not medicated,
he would be found permanently incompetent to stand trial, and, pursuant to Jackson,
could be confined thereafter through the civil commitment process. Nevertheless, the
majority failed to consider: (1) whether detention for four years as an incompetent
criminal defendant is permissible under Jackson, and (2) whether detention beyond four
years as an incompetent criminal defendant is permissible under Jackson.
162. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210
(Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in nonemergency situations, antipsychotic medication
cannot be administered to involuntarily committed civil patients without their consent
absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make treatment decisions); Rogers
v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) (holding that
involuntarily committed civil patients do not lose the right to make treatment decisions
unless they are adjudicated incompetent by a judge in incompetency proceedings);
Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342–44 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that involuntary civil
commitment, without more, does not establish that the committed person lacks the
mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of medication refusal decisions and
that a judicial determination that the patient lacks that capacity is required before the
state may administer antipsychotic drugs over the patient’s objection). Utilizing the
informed consent doctrine, “virtually every court that has considered the matter now
recognizes a ‘right to refuse’ psychotropic medication for institutionalized populations.”
RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 923 (4th ed. 2004).
163. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990).
See supra text
accompanying notes 147–51. Nevertheless, one can assert that a mentally disordered
prisoner who has been transferred to a mental hospital should not be distinguished from
other mental patients who have been civilly committed to a mental hospital. The transfer
from a prison to a hospital suspends the prisoner’s punishment. Security measures
should depend on the pathology and severity of the patient’s mental disorder, not on the
patient’s status as a prisoner. See Morris, Confusion of Confinement, supra note 19, at
661–63.
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legitimate interest in protecting them, and in protecting others from
them, is achieved by the confinement itself—without coerced treatment.
If the confined individual competently chooses to refuse treatment, even
if such decision may prolong his or her confinement, the individual’s
interest—one that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized to be a
significant, constitutionally protected liberty interest164—should outweigh
any claimed governmental interest in coercing treatment.
One cannot assume that a criminal defendant who is incompetent to
stand trial is necessarily incompetent to make treatment decisions. The
issue for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant is able to
understand the criminal proceedings and to assist in his or her defense.
The issue for competence to refuse antipsychotic medication is whether
the individual can weigh the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the
proposed medication. Because the issues are different, a defendant who
is incompetent for one purpose may be competent for the other.165
Competent civil patients, however, do not have an absolute right to
refuse antipsychotic medication. The state does have a legitimate
interest in protecting other patients and staff from dangerous mental
patients. This danger, however, is far less in a mental hospital than it is
in a prison.166 Unlike prisons, mental hospitals have professional and
support staff trained in dealing with problems of potential violence.
Hospital staff may respond to threatening situations using alternative
approaches such as segregation, physical restraints, psychotherapy, and
behavior therapy.167 At most, all that is needed is authority to
involuntarily sedate the patient in an emergency situation, when the
patient presents an immediate danger to himself or herself or to others.168
164. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22 (holding that under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a mentally ill prisoner “possesses a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the forcing of
antipsychotic drugs on criminal defendants held for trial “absent a finding of overriding
justification and a determination of medical appropriateness”).
165. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 413 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“A person who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not thereby ‘competent’ to play the
violin. . . . Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for
another purpose.”).
166. See Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to Refuse Mental Health
Treatment: The Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205,
228–29 (1993).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(e) (West Supp. 2004) (authorizing
coerced treatment in an emergency). Another California statute defines an emergency as
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Nevertheless, this exercise of the state’s police power must end when the
emergency that warranted this exercise of authority ends. If a person’s
“significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs”169 is to have any meaning at all, a claim that the
patient was committed as being too dangerous to live in society, or that
he or she presents a generalized danger to other patients or staff in the
institution, should not be useable as an excuse to authorize nonemergency,
coerced treatment of a competent civil patient.
In Sell, however, the Supreme Court eschews this analysis. Justice
Breyer correctly notes that involuntary medical treatment is typically
addressed as a civil matter, and that every state provides for the
appointment of a guardian who may make a medication decision for a
patient who has been found incompetent to make that decision.170 But
then he adds that “courts, in civil proceedings, may authorize
involuntary medication where the patient’s failure to accept treatment
threatens injury to the patient or others.”171 As authority for this
proposition, Justice Breyer does not cite any state statutes or state court
decisions. Rather, he cites a federal regulation that implements a federal
statute.172 The statute is a federal civil commitment law, authorizing the
detention of dangerous, sentence-expiring prisoners and dangerous,
incompetent criminal defendants against whom all criminal charges have
been dismissed.173 The statute, which establishes a special civil commitment
process solely for these two patient categories, appears to contravene
Baxstrom and Jackson. It was not applicable to Charles Sell because the
criminal charges against him had not been dismissed. Even if the statute
“a situation in which action to impose treatment over the person’s objection is
immediately necessary for the preservation of life or the prevention of serious bodily
harm to the patient or others, and it is impracticable to first gain consent.” Id. § 5008(m)
(West 1998).
169. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22 (holding that under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, even a mentally ill prisoner “possesses a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”).
170. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003). The Court also asserts, far
more questionably, that the guardian decides to authorize treatment when to do so is in
the patient’s best interests. Id. Several courts, however, have held that the guardian’s
responsibility is to decide the question of acceptability of treatment on the basis of how
the patient would have decided that question if the patient was competent. In other
words, the guardian is to apply a “substituted judgment” model, not a “best interest”
model. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. 1979); In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40,
51–52 (Mass. 1981). Thus, for example, if the patient is a practicing Christian Scientist,
the incompetent patient, if competent, would refuse treatment even if it was in his or her
best interest to accept it, and under a “substituted judgment” model, the guardian should
not consent to its imposition upon the patient.
171. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
172. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000)).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (2000). The statute authorizes federal commitment only
when suitable arrangements for state custody are not available. Id.
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was valid and was applicable to Sell, the statute says nothing about the
government’s authority to coerce treatment on those who are confined.
The federal regulation cited as authority by Justice Breyer does not
implement or even pertain to the special commitment process
established by the cited statute, but rather, to forced medication of
patients after they have been committed. The regulation provides for a
hearing by a psychiatrist to determine whether coerced treatment “is
necessary because the inmate is dangerous to self or others.” And yet,
the Sell majority uncritically accepts this arguably inappropriate
regulation as its sole authority to support its ruling that a court may grant
permission, on “Harper-type grounds”174 to forcibly medicate dangerous
criminal defendants who are competent to make treatment decisions in
nonemergency situations.
Ignoring the criminal defendant’s liberty interest in refusing medication,
the majority simply notes that “the inquiry into whether medication is
permissible . . . to render an individual nondangerous is usually more
‘objective and manageable’ than the inquiry into whether medication is
permissible to render a defendant competent.”175 The majority adds that
“medical experts may find it easier” to express an informed opinion on
whether particular medications “are medically appropriate and necessary
to control a patient’s potentially dangerous behavior . . . than to try to
balance harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially legal
questions of trial fairness and competence.”176 Through the Sell decision,
a nonconvict’s significant liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic
medication is lost as the distinction between civil and criminal evaporates;
the line between the mad and the bad disappears. Objectivity and
manageability of the inquiry plus ease of adjudication—in other words,
expediency—trumps an individual’s supposedly constitutionally protected
liberty interest.177

174. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
175. Id. at 182.
176. Id.
177. Ironically, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote a
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Harper case, criticizing the majority for
authorizing the forced medication of mentally disordered, sentence-serving convicts.
Imposing psychotropic medication on prisoners to serve institutional concerns and
“institutional convenience eviscerates the inmate’s substantive liberty interest in the
integrity of his body and mind.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 249–50 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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VII. CONCLUSION: US V. THEM
In an address to Congress a few days after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attack, President Bush informed the world: “Every nation in
every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you
are with the terrorists.”178 We are at war, we were informed, and any
nation that harbors or supports terrorism will be regarded as a hostile
regime.179 It is us versus them.
In this fight against a concept—terrorism—instead of a country, we
have changed the rules of war. We claim a right to make preemptive
strikes against foreign dictators who might harbor weapons of mass
destruction that might be used against us. Regime change, at our discretion,
is a viable foreign policy option. American citizens have been designated
as “enemy combatants” and held in secret military custody without any
criminal charges filed against them and without any trials to determine
their guilt or innocence.180 Non-Americans, captured in the fighting in
Afghanistan, have been imprisoned indefinitely at Guantanamo, without
being accorded prisoner of war status.181
Our war against terrorism is a war against those who commit violent
acts. In our quest for security against violence, it is easy to include as
enemies mentally disordered sentence-expiring convicts, mentally
incompetent criminal defendants, and persons acquitted of crime by
reason of insanity. Although they do not qualify as religiously inspired,
foreign terrorists, we nevertheless perceive them as dangerous, and can
easily qualify them as domestic terrorists. We are told that these
individuals cannot be punished. Sentence-expiring convicts have served
their criminal sentences; incompetent criminal defendants have not been
178. Transcript of President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress on
Thursday Night, September 20, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.
transcript/index (Sept. 21, 2001).
179. Id.
180. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), the United States Supreme
Court ruled that “the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] is explicit
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals” who fought against the
United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban. Id. at 2639–40. Thus, detention of
enemy combatants of that conflict constituted “an exercise of the ‘necessary and
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.” Id. at 2640.
Nevertheless, the Court also held “that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before
a neutral decisionmaker. . . . These essential constitutional promises may not be
eroded.” Id. at 2648–49. Additionally, “[the citizen-detainee] unquestionably has the
right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings . . . .” Id. at 2652.
181. More than two years after the fighting in Afghanistan ended, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that under the federal habeas statute, aliens held in federal custody
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base may challenge the legality of their detention in a federal
district court. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004).
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tried; insanity acquittees have not been convicted. But we do not accept
what we are told. Although traditional civil commitment might enable
us to treat their mental disorder and their danger, we believe the time
constraints typically placed on such commitments make such an option
inadequate. And so we substitute special civil commitment for these
individuals, a post-incarceration incarceration,182 cloaking our punishment
agenda in long-term treatment garb.183 Does it surprise you to learn that
only two of the more than 500 California SVPs committed to Atascadero
State Hospital since the SVP law was enacted nine years ago have been
conditionally released to the community?184 And both of those patients
underwent surgical castration before they were released.185 Despite
California’s multibillion-dollar budget deficit, the state is currently
spending $377 million to construct a new facility at Coalinga in order to
accommodate an expanded SVP population of 1500 when that facility
opens in 2005.186
In the fifty years since the University of San Diego School of Law was
established, we have seen Supreme Court jurisprudence shift from the
Warren Court’s liberal application of the Constitution to prohibit the
special categorization of sentence-expiring prisoners187 and permanently

182. The term “post incarceration incarceration” appears in a speech presented by
George Alexander in a symposium celebrating the eightieth birthday of Thomas S.
Szasz, M.D. George J. Alexander, The State’s Insatiable Need to Incarcerate Those
Who Frighten It, at http://www.szasz.com/alexanderremarks.html (last modified June 22,
2002).
183. For example, Michael Perlin asserts that sexually violent predator legislation
“blur[s] the borderline between civil and criminal . . . [by enforcing] social control in
punitive ways under the guise of the beneficence of civil commitment.” The Supreme
Court’s Hendricks decision upholding the constitutionality of SVP legislation “has the
potential of transforming psychiatric treatment facilities into de facto prisons.” Michael
L. Perlin, “On Desolation Row”: The Blurring of the Borders Between Civil and
Criminal Mental Disability Law, and What It Means to All of Us, Keynote Address at the
annual meeting of the American Association of Psychiatry and the Law (Oct. 2002)
(manuscript of address available from the author); see also The Supreme Court, 1996
Term—Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 259, 266 (1997) (asserting that after
Hendricks, “the risk increases that a potentially lifelong deprivation of liberty via the
civil system will be imposed to serve goals traditionally and rightfully reserved for the
criminal system—retribution and deterrence”).
184. Telephone interview with Barrie Haffler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero
State Hospital, Atascadero, Cal. (Jan. 15, 2004).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see supra text accompanying notes
8–20.
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incompetent criminal defendants188 for civil commitment, to the Burger
and Rehnquist Court’s conservative application of the Constitution to
permit the special categorization of insanity acquittees189 and SVPs190 for
civil commitment, and to permit the coerced treatment of competent,
though dangerous, criminal defendants.191 In a post-September 11, 2001
America, at a time when we are obsessed with our desire for security
from potentially violent people, this trend away from protection of
individual rights is not likely to be reversed.192
Benjamin Franklin once observed, “He who sacrifices freedom for
security is neither free nor secure.”193 But to us, our founding father’s
prescience seems passé. We are not adversely affected by laws that
specially categorize mentally disordered people who have been involved
in some way in the criminal process and whose release into society we
fear. Those laws protect us. After all, we know that we are not mentally
disordered, dangerous, or involved in the criminal process. And in
today’s world, it is us versus them. We fail to consider that when any
person’s rights are lost, our Constitutional rule of law is undermined. To
the extent that the Supreme Court allows that to happen, the shepherd is
asleep. The distance between right and wrong has broken down.

188. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes
25–33.
189. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see supra text accompanying
notes 39–52.
190. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see supra text accompanying notes
59–84, 89–123.
191. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); see supra text accompanying notes
124–77.
192. For example, the California Supreme Court recently held that a sentenceexpiring convict who has been civilly committed under California’s Mentally Disordered
Offender law may be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs even if he or she is
competent to refuse it, provided a court determines that the individual is dangerous
within the meaning of the state’s regular civil commitment statutes. In re Qawi, 81 P.3d
224, 240 (Cal. 2004).
193. ACLU of Northern California, Keep Our Communities Safe and Free, at
http://aclunc.org/911/ (last visited July 30, 2004), quoting Benjamin Franklin.
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